INTRODUCTION
C ontainer supply chains (CSCs) are vulnerable to many risks that have been identified from studies since the 1970s. Most of them focused on the research of vulnerability and disturbances in the chains. Disturbances in supply chains are a common phenomenon 1, 2, 3, 4 and preventative actions may significantly reduce the frequency and damage of disturbances. Therefore, a variety of concepts and methods have been developed to reduce vulnerability and prevent disturbances in supply chains. These include Kaizen, 5, 6 Jidoka, 7 Andon, 8 the Seven Q:s and the Seven New Q:s, 9 Autonomation, 8, 10 Five why, 9 Total productive maintenance (TPM), 11 Single-minute exchange of die (SMED), 12 and 5S. 8 Furthermore, much research about the vulnerability in supply chains has been conducted and positioned under the concept of contingency planning (CP). Ballou 13 and Johnson and Wood 14 identified two sub-groups of CP, namely system breakdown and product recall. Principally, vulnerability research belongs to the category of system breakdown. Thus, in order to better review the risk research in supply chains, the studies about CP, especially the sub-group of system breakdown studies, are important information resources. Coyle 15 stated that CP considers preparing to deal with calamities (ie, flood) and non-calamitous situations (ie, strikes) before they occur. Many risk/uncertainty models 16 and reliability analyses 17, 18 under the umbrella of CP are closely related to the vulnerability research in supply chains.
Serious accidents, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the lock-out of the American West Coast Ports in 2002 and the recent rampant pirate activities off Somali, shocked Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains the whole maritime logistics society and stimulated the concern that the safety and security performance of CSCs needed to be reviewed on an urgent basis. People started to adopt more systematic and effective methods to assess and manage their supply chains. A method of quantifying the reliability of supply chains for contingent logistics systems was developed based on a reliability interference theory. 19 Some of the strategies for risk management were presented and applied to assess and mitigate the risks in inbound logistics. 20 Narahari 21 and Garg 22 introduced and applied an innovative approach by designing a Six Sigma supply chain network to qualify supply chains in terms of synchronised delivery. After reviewing existing techniques used in decision making for risk analysis, Pai 23 presented a modelling and analysis framework for assessing logistics risks and evaluating safeguards to secure supply chains. Svensson 24 , 25 generated a framework for managing vulnerability in supply chains and analysing it from companies' inbound and outbound logistics flows. Chapman 26 identified supply chain vulnerability and used an advanced '3-P' approach to manage risks in logistics supply chains. Peck and Jüttner 27 further identified the vulnerability in logistics supply chains and gave its failure modes in detail in a survey to 137 senior supply chain managers.
Responding to security risks, much effort was made to enforce the security of international ship and port facilities against terrorism risks. A large number of optional maritime safety and security control measures have been proposed by various regulations 28, 29, 30, 31 and publications in the post-9/11 era. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 There is a strong need for a sound and generic methodology that is capable of taking into account multiple selection criteria such as the cost effectiveness of the measures based on reasonable risk assessment.
The use of traditional risk assessment approaches to deal with newly rising hazards and threats (ie, potential terrorist attacks to a maritime transport system) reveals two of the major challenges. They are lack of capability of processing diverse data in a utility form suitable as input to a risk inference mechanism, and lack of capability of analysing the interactive dependence between risk factors.
Given the diversity of scales at which the risks in CSCs may occur, a serious challenge for risk analysts is to integrate quantitative descriptions of these risks into coherent assessment models. Methods are required that allow risk representation at multiple scales and in a variety of forms, depending on available information. There is also a need to assess how uncertainties in each component of the model translate to uncertainty in the final safety predictions. Many traditional risk assessment methods such as a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) approach may not be well suited to dealing with a situation of having a high level of uncertainty. One realistic way to cope with uncertainties in risk assessment is to use the combination of fuzzy logic 37 and Dampster-Shafer (D-S) 38, 39 theories. 40, 41, 42 Fuzzy logic is used to model the uncertainty (fuzziness) resulting from unavailable historical failure data in some sub-systems or components of CSCs. Evidential reasoning 43, 44 based on D-S theory excels in tackling incompleteness and thus can be used to synthesise the fuzzy risk analysis results from an elementary state to a top level.
Some supply chain risk management models represent attempts to combine the understanding gained from multiple studies into a single framework. Most models do this by endeavouring to simulate all of the physical and managerial processes occurring in the chains at a pre-determined model scale. 26, 27, 23 However, responding to the nature of these processes, the most predictable relationships among different risk variables may emerge at a variety of spatial, temporal or functional scales. Therefore, current safety knowledge might be better represented if each relationship was described at or between the dynamic and interactive levels of detail at which the key risk variables could be identified.
Bayesian networks (BNs) constitute a class of probabilistic models with strong connections to graph theory, 45 which can be considered as a feasible way of structuring a situation for reasoning uncertainty with an interactive feature. Actually, they have proven to be a powerful formalism to express complex dependence between random variables. 46 Recently, their popularity started to grow among system risk assessors and reliability analysts. Earlier work 47, 48, 46, 49 examined the parallels between BNs and other QRA approaches and indicated the strengths of BNs in terms of modelling interaction of risk factors and incorporating new risk input.
This study uses the advances of the above uncertainty treatment methods to enhance the safety and security of CSCs and to enrich the insufficient literature of supply chain safety research. To achieve this, the paper identifies the major challenges in CSC risk assessment, constructs a risk spiral model of CSCs, reviews typical uncertainty treatment methods for decision making, represents novel risk assessment methods and finally concludes with the contributions of the proposed risk modelling of CSCs.
MAJOR CHALLENGES IN CSC RISK ASSESSMENT
Today's container supply chains are characterised by risks, as instanced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks amongst others, that have threatened the safety and security of CSCs. The definitions of the risks existing in the chains have changed and broadened. The risks have tended to increase for a number of reasons. Supply and demand in almost every industrial sector of the CSCs seems to be more volatile and uncertain than in the past. International container physical distribution chains become longer due to marketing globalisation. The increased use of logistics partners results in complex international distribution network relationships. The requirements of faster delivery service, shorter lead time and lower costs without compromising benefits to customers, together with the applications of new products and technologies, have also led to higher exposure to risks. Consequently, assessing the risks in modern competitive CSCs becomes increasingly challenging and requires appropriate analysis of their risk characteristics to be carried out.
The risks associated with modern CSCs are complex. This can be evidenced by the fact that different risk forms have been defined using the diverse categorising methods described in the previous studies. 50, 51, 26 The complexity of CSCs' risks may further rise when they interrelate with the other risk characteristics, such as uncertainty and dependence. This can be explained through constructing a risk spiral, which is developed on the basis of the risk spiral model of Christopher and Lee, 52 shown in Fig 1. The risk complexity leads to the lack of visibility to monitor the safety performance of CSCs. It is often the case that one member of a supply chain has no detailed knowledge of what goes on in other parts of the chain, eg, adopting (or not) adequate risk mitigation/control measures for keeping the reliability and continuity of the chain. Because there is no visibility of upstream and downstream flows and stocks, confidence declines and decisions are taken to apply safety control measures to the individual sections/sub-chains of the supply chain for preventing/mitigating risks. The lack of confidence also means that it is difficult to make optimal safety control measures at each stage of the CSCs. The risks of making wrong or ineffective decisions become an inevitable consequence. Thus, it becomes possible to produce overreactions, unnecessary interventions, second guessing, mistrust and distorted information throughout the supply chain.
These overreactions are time-consuming and then serve to further obscure supply chain visibility because CSCs are now more complex as a result of the establishment of the longer end-to-end supply chains involving many unnecessary interventions. Consequently, an internal self-perpetuating risk spiral is formed and a new intangible risk is produced due to the lack of confidence. Such an internal risk spiral is frail and can be broken by effective risk control measures, such as the improved confidence via the introduction of shared information. However, the entry of uncertainty and interactive dependence makes the spiral stronger and its running speed faster; an external risk spiral comes into shape to support the internal one. Obviously, uncertainty makes it nearly impossible to clearly identify the vulnerability of CSCs and assess their risks. Interactive dependence significantly discounts the effectiveness of risk control. This risk spiral exists everywhere, and the only way to break the spiral is to understand and appropriately deal with the uncertainty and interactive dependence in the CSCs.
Uncertainty is a context dependent concept and it does not have a comprehensive and unique definition. The uncertainty discussed in this paper is associated with the definition of vulnerability in CSCs. Although the vulnerability concept has been in use for more than twenty years since Timmerman's conceptualisation, 53 presently, there is still no common conceptualization of vulnerability, and the meanings of vulnerability are still ambiguous and fuzzy. 54 Many of the discrepancies in the meanings of vulnerability arise from different epistemological orientations and subsequent methodological practices. In a CSC context, vulnerability can be defined as 'an exposure to serious disturbances, arising from a hazard or threat'. 55 Further studying the definition of the vulnerability of the chains, one will appreciate the distinction between hazards and threats. Differing from the definition of a hazard, a threat can be defined as an action or a potential action rather than a physical situation likely to cause damage, harm or loss. 56 It means that the hazard-based vulnerability more likely tends to perform mechanistic probability distributions, while the threatbased vulnerability is closely connected with behavioural probability distributions. Thus, the understanding of the hazard-based vulnerability may come from objective historical accident statistics as well as subjective judgements if necessary, while threat-based vulnerability may better be described and presented using expert judgements based on linguistic variables. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the threat-based risks are potentially greater than hazard-based risks because they are often not within the focal companies' direct control. Furthermore, the behaviour can be expressed in vague or qualitative terms, but the behaviour is inherently difficult to quantify. Consequently, it will be unavoidable to face a tremendous challenge of reasoning the threat-based risks without sufficient objective information.
CSC safety systems suffer from high levels of dependence between their risk factors/components. In order to stay competitive, maintain cost-effectiveness, and achieve reasonable safety and reliability, the systems have to take into account such risk dependence. However, most of the available methods in system reliability analysis, for example, series/parallel configuration, cut-set, tie-set and fault tree analysis, etc, only consider independence and full dependence 57 and assume that partial failures of the components do not affect the performance of other components, though this is not the realistic case. 58 Moreover, the techniques which do not consider the partial dependence are approximate methods. For safety critical CSC systems the risks with the nature of dependence may become more inaccurate or even conflict with reality as the approximation at a microscopic concern is accumulated and magnified to a macroscopic level.
FUZZY RULE-BASED EVIDENTIAL REASONING (FRBER) APPROACH IN PORT SECURITY ESTIMATION
As far as the threat of terrorism is concerned, the lack of critical mass in statistical data proves the tasks of adapting traditional approaches to be challenging and generating novel and uniformed methodologies to be urgent. One realistic way to analyse security with unavailable or incomplete objective data is to employ subjective assessment based on fuzzy IF-THEN rules in fuzzy logic. The approach based on the fuzzy rules, where conditional parts and/or conclusions contain linguistic variables, 59 can model the qualitative aspects of human knowledge and reasoning process without employing precise quantitative analysis. It does not require an expert to provide a precise point at which a risk factor exists. The purpose of analysing security is to rank the high-level risks in a prioritised list so as to ensure the optimal asset management. To realise this aim, the proposed framework for modelling security assessment consists of five major components, which outline all the necessary steps required for port security analysis.
Identify risk parameters and define fuzzy input and output variables
The threat-based risk parameters used to define subjective security estimates include those at both the antecedent and consequence parts. The consequence parameter is 'Security estimate (SE)', the single fuzzy output variable, which can be defuzzified to prioritise the risks. The variable is described linguistically and is determined by some antecedent parameters. In risk assessment, it is common to express a security level by degrees to which it belongs to such linguistic terms as 'Poor', 'Fair', 'Average' and 'Good' that are referred to as security expressions.
To analyse the antecedent parameters, four fundamental risk parameters can be identified and defined as 'Will' (W), 'Damage capability' (D), 'Recovery difficulty' (R) and 'Damage probability' (P).
W is the likelihood of a threat-based risk, which directly represents the lengths one goes through in taking a certain action. To estimate W, one may choose to use such linguistic terms as 'Very weak', 'Weak', 'Average', 'Strong' and 'Very strong'.
The combination of D and R responds to the consequence severity of the threat-based risk. Specifically speaking, D indicates the destructive force/execution of a certain action and R hints the resilience of the system after the occurrence of a failure or disaster. The following linguistic terms can be considered as a reference to be used in subjectively describing the two sister parameters: 'Negligible', 'Moderate', 'Critical' and 'Catastrophic' for D and 'Easy', 'Average', 'Difficult' and 'Extremely Difficult' for R. P means the probability of the occurrence of consequences and can be defined as the probability that damage consequences happen given the occurrence of the event. One may choose to use such linguistic terms as 'Unlikely', 'Average', 'Likely' and 'Definite' to describe it. 60 Fuzzy logic accommodates such linguistic terms through the concept of partial membership. Triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy memberships have been used to describe the linguistic variables, defined above, in security assessment (Table 1) .
Construct a fuzzy rule base for port security assessment
Fuzzy logic systems are knowledge-based or rule-based systems constructed from human knowledge in the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules. An important contribution of the fuzzy system theory is that it provides a systematic procedure for transforming a knowledge base into a non-linear mapping. 61 A fuzzy IF-THEN rule is an IF-THEN statement in which some words are characterised by continuous membership functions.
To capture the incompleteness of experts' knowledge in establishing a strong correlation between premise and conclusion, a belief structure is introduced. Having identified the port security risk parameters and their corresponding linguistic variables, fuzzy IF-THEN rules with a belief structure can be constructed to model the security assessment scenario. For example, two belief IF-THEN rules can be developed as follows:
R1: IF W of a threat is 'Very strong' AND D is 'Catastrophic'
AND R is 'Extremely difficult' AND P is 'Definite', THEN SE is 'Poor' with a belief degree of 1, 'Fair' with a belief degree of 0, 'Average' with a belief degree of 0 and 'Good' with a belief degree of 0. R2: IF W of a threat is 'Very strong' AND D is 'Catastrophic' AND R is 'Extremely difficult'AND P is 'Likely', THEN SE is 'Poor' with a belief degree of 0.9, 'Fair' with a belief degree of 0.1, 'Average' with a belief degree of 0 and 'Good' with a belief degree of 0.
Such rules can be simplified and expressed as follows: Assume that the four antecedent parameters, W, D, R and P can be described by linguistic variable Aij i , where i = 1, 2, 3, or 4 respectively and J1 = 1, …, or 5, J2, J3 and J4 = 1, …, or 4. One consequent variable SE can be described by four Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains It is noted that all the parameters and the belief degrees of the rules are usually assigned at the knowledge acquisition phrase by multiple experts on the basis of subjective judgements. A complete rule base including 320 rules with a belief degree structure is provided in the work by Yang. 60 The logicality of belief degrees assigned can be verified by a self-tuning approach. 62 Such a rule base represents functional mapping between antecedents and conclusions, possibly with uncertainty. It provides a more informative, realistic scheme than a simple IF-THEN rule base does on uncertain knowledge representation.
Apply a FRBER approach to port security assessment
The rule-based system established above, which can be used to perform inference from given fuzzy or incomplete observations to the corresponding fuzzy output, is used to assess the security level of a vulnerable port target. The inference procedure is basically summarised as follows.
To start the inference process, observations available should be analysed to determine their relationship with each risk parameter in the antecedent in a numerical form. Four kinds of possible observations may be represented using membership functions to suit conditions under this study. They are either a single deterministic value with 100% certainty, a closed interval, a triangular distribution or a trapezoidal distribution. Having defined the four antecedent risk parameters and the memberships of their linguistic variables above, a matching function method 42 can be employed to convert the observations and determine the belief degrees to which the actual observations, which have been numerically described, match each linguistic variable in the antecedent. The matching function method chooses the Max-Min operation to show the similarity between the real input fuzzy set A r and the corresponding fuzzy linguistic variables Aij i , because it is a classical tool to set the matching degree between fuzzy sets. 59 Therefore, the matching degree between A r and Aij i can be defined as follows: (2) where x covers the domain of the input A r . Each aij i , represents the extent to which A r belongs to the defined linguistic variables in the i th risk parameter in the antecedents. It is noteworthy that the fuzzy input may also be directly judged and expressed by experts using linguistic variables with belief structures.
Once the observations are converted and expressed by the pre-defined linguistic variables of the risk parameters with belief structures, it is necessary to introduce them into the rule-based inference system constructed in the previous section. An activating rule weight method is used to implement such an introduction. In other words, the distributions of different weights to all rules can be used to describe the relationship between the risk input transformed from observations and the rules in the system.
In order to obtain an appropriate weight for the k th rule, the similarity degrees related to the k th rule are required to be synthesised in a logical way that can reflect the AND connective between their representing risk parameters. The Product operator as the logical tool has been recommended to model the AND connective in fuzzy rules, 42 and thus, it is used to deal with the dependencies of the parameters W, D, R and P. Consequently, since the four junior risk parameters have been considered and assigned the same importance in this study, the weight of the k th rule can be calculated as follows:
Note that the situations where some of are equal to zero will significantly simplify the calculation through the ignorance of the rules including those linguistic variables with a zero similarity degree. Consequently, a new rule base can be generated to include the relevant rules with weights more than zero. The significance of doing this is to reduce the size of the rule base investigated. It can be summarised using a new rule expression matrix.
Having represented all the employed rules in the rule expression matrix, the ER approach and its attached calculation software IDS 44 can be used to combine the rules and generate a final conclusion, which is a belief distribution on the security expressions and will also give a panoramic view about the security level for a given observation. 60 The kernel of this approach is an ER algorithm developed on the basis of the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, which requires modelling the narrowing of the hypothesis set with the requirements of the accumulation of evidence. 44 It uses the concept of degrees of belief to model the knowledge incompleteness of decision makers in using fuzzy linguistic variables to estimate the security parameter values.
Rank security estimates
In order to rank the security estimates expressed by fuzzy sets, the fuzzy linguistic variables require to be defuzzified by giving each of them an 'appropriate' utility value (Uv). Many defuzzification algorithms have been developed, of which a centroid approach 63 may be well suited to modelling the fuzzy security expressions. The four security linguistic expressions, which have been defined using fuzzy memberships in the sec- Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains
security expressions, 'Poor', 'Fair', 'Average' and 'Good'. It is obvious that a smaller Nv means that the relevant threat mode is less secure and thus, requires more attention in a risk control process.
An illustrative example
In this section, a numerical example is examined using the proposed FRBER method. A port is highly likely to be attacked by terrorists using two ways, attacking the channel/waterway or bombing the quayside infrastructures/facilities of the terminals. Either of them can be associated with several attacking modes. The scenario is analysed in Fig 2 using a fault tree analysis method.
Suppose four security analysts make their judgements on each attacking mode for the calculation of the security level of a target port. The four analysts have the same influence/ importance in this assessment. The judgements are assessed on the basis of the four defined antecedent risk parameters. For example, the mode of 'using a missile or bomb to attack the channel' (EXT-CHA) can be analysed in Table 2 . Using Equation (2), the input (observations) in Table 2 can be transformed and the judgements can be uniquely expressed by linguistic variables in Table 3 . Then the fuzzy input based on all expert judgements can be synthesised using the ER approach.
Having known the fuzzy input, the evaluation of the consequence risk parameter, SE can be performed using the proposed FRBER method. In the rule base, 320 rules have been established, of which only 36 rules are hired in this particular case, ie, Rules #18, #19, #22, #23, #26, #27, #34, #35, #38, #39, #42, #43, #82, #83, #86, #87, #90, #91, #98, #99, #102, #103, #106, #107, #146, #147, #150, #43, #82, #83, #86, #87, #90, #91, #98, #99, #102, #103, #106, #107, #146, #147, #150, #151, #154, #155, #162, #163, #166, #167, #170 and #171.
Based on the individual matching belief degrees, the activation weight k (k = 1, …, 36) of each rule in the hired sub-rule base is calculated using Equation (3). Consequently, the fuzzy rule expression matrix for the sub-rule base with the employed 36 rules is shown in Table 4 .
In Table 4 , the ER approach is used to implement the combination of the 36 rules and generate the security estimate of the EXT-CHA threat. The final assessment result can be computed as follow:
The SE of the EXT-CHA threat: {0, 'Poor', 0.188, 'Fair', 0.771, 'Average', 0.041, 'Good'} This result can be interpreted in such a way that the security level of the EXT-CHA threat is estimated as 'Fair' with a belief degree of 0.188, 'Average' with a belief degree of 0.771, and 'Good' with a belief degree of 0.041. Next, Equation (4) can be used to calculate the index value of the SE for a ranking purpose as follows:
Similar computations are performed for the other five basic events in the case. The index values of the SE generated for the VES-CHA, CARGO, EMPLOYEE, EXT-TER and VES-TER threats are summarised in the set of {0.268, 0.4, 0.603, 0.579, 0.317}. In terms of risk contributions, the threats can be ranked in such an order as VES-CHA>VES-TER>CARGO>EXT-TER>EXT-CHA. This means that the threat of using vessels to carry out suicide attacks in the channel areas is the highest in this analysis. Simultaneously, it is noteworthy that the security estimates of the basic events can be synthesised using the ER approach to obtain the security 
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A FUZZY RULE-BASED BAYESIAN REASONING APPROACH (FURBAR) TO IDENTIFY VULNERABLE ASSETS
The FuRBaR approach was firstly generated in the reliability context to facilitate the development of the failure mode and effects analysis technique. 64 The kernel of the FuRBaR approach is to appropriately transform belief degrees in rule bases into subjective conditional probabilities in Bayesian networks. The transformation functioning as an effective link makes it possible to use the advantages of both fuzzy and Bayesian inference. Earlier work has indicated that it is beneficial to combine fuzzy logic and Bayesian reasoning for the purpose of compensating their individual disadvantages. In the safety and reliability studies, further information about the combination (Fuzzy-Bayesian) can be found in the work by Bott and Eisenhawer, 65 Eleye-Datubo 66 and Huang. 67 It is noteworthy that the concept of Fuzzy-Bayesian can be explained in different meanings, and expressed in various formats to address diverse research issues and interests. FuRBaR is developed to explain the role of Bayesian networks in fuzzy rule based risk inference in a complementary way, in which the Bayesian marginalisation rule is used to aggregate all relevant IF-THEN rules with belief structures, and produce failure priority values expressed by posterior probabilities of linguistic risk expressions. When being applied to a security analysis scenario, its framework includes the following major steps. A comparison technique has been used to compare the FuRBaR method with the above FRBER approach through analysing their correlation. The advantages of comparison are not only to validate the logic of the two methods, but also to demonstrate their individual advantages in terms of capability of modelling incompleteness, the transparency of the analytical process, and easiness in calculation. 64 The major difference between the two methods lies in the above step 3, where the belief structure in the rule base developed above is transformed and represented in the form of conditional probabilities. For example, the above R2 in Equation (1) can be displayed as follows.
Given W5 AND D4 AND R4 AND P3, the probability of Sh (h = 1, …, 4) is (0.9, 0.1, 0, 0), or p(Sh|W5, D4, R4, P3) = (0.9, 0.1, 0, 0) where '|' symbolises 'conditional probability'.
Using a Bayesian network technique, the rule base can be modelled using a five-node converging connection. It includes four parent nodes, NW, ND, NR and NP (Nodes W, D, R and P); and one child node NS (Node S). Having transferred the rule base into a Bayesian network framework, the rulebased risk inference for the security analysis will be simplified as the calculation of the marginal probability of the node NS. To marginalise S, the required conditional probability table of NS, p(S|W, D, R, P), can be obtained by converting the rule base into a conditional probability format (ie, Equation (5)). Once the observations are obtained, they can be transformed and expressed by the linguistic variables defined in Table 1 with belief degrees. The transformation can be completed using fuzzy Max-Min mapping operation intending to measure the similarity of two fuzzy sets in Equation (2) . The normalised belief degrees can be considered as the prior probabilities of the four parent nodes, which are symbolised as p(Wi), p(Dj), p(Rk) and p(Pl) (i = 1, …, 5; j = 1, …, 4; k = 1, …, 4; l = 1, …, 4), respectively. Having analysed all the unconditional probabilities of the five nodes, the marginal probability of Ns can be calculated as follows: 45 (6) To prioritise the security risks, Sh (h = 1, …, 4) requires the assignment of appropriate utility values USh . The utility values can be calculated by defuzzifying the memberships of Sh (in Table 1 ) using a centroid method. Consequently, S1 = 0.922, S2 = 0.65, S3 = 0.35 and S4 = 0.078, where for instance the geometric centroid of the trapezoid S1 (0.8, 0.9, 1, 1) = .
Then a new security ranking index can be developed as follows. (7) where the larger the value of RI is, the better the security level. A novel conceptual maritime security management framework, based on the above FuRBaR security assessment method, can be developed to model security risk observation attributes. The proposed framework consists of the following major components.
Identify observation attributes
Maritime security analysts may need to consider many different attributes influencing the four risk parameters W, D, R and P, especially when direct observations associated with the four parameters are unavailable. First, all the criteria, parameters and attributes require to be identified in a hierarchy using a top-down approach, in which the evaluations of the bottom-level attributes can be obtained using either objective data or subjective judgment by experts with confidence. Such evaluations can be synthesised to calculate the preference value of the top-level factor. The identification process will entail extensive interaction with security analysts and practical anti-pirate and anti-terrorist (ATAP) operations including questionnaire surveys and interviews with marine masters and security officers, etc. Since this process is essentially dynamic and scenario-based, the factors involved in one analysis can significantly differ with another and thus, the development of a unique comprehensive model including all possible factors is not realistic.
As an alternative, a 'live' database regularly updated through collecting the factors used in real applications with time enables the development of a generic basic model including the most frequently used factors in the past as a reference for future analysis. Next, belief fuzzy rule bases in Equation (2) will be established to model the non-linear relationship between the factors at a parent-children cluster in the hierarchy. Due to the high quantity of the factors in a complex situation, the analysts may not be able to directly establish the rule bases with belief structures using their own knowledge. For instance, the likelihood, W of a port facility being attacked may be determined by its value, function, population accommodated, distance to the controlled perimeter, ease of access, recognition to unknown persons and symbolic values, etc.
It is usually the case that the analysts may not establish a strong connection between all the factors and the estimation of W with 100% confidence. This situation may also be worrisome when the interaction of the factors (ie, between the recognition to unknown persons and symbolic values) is concerned. 60 This investigation therefore starts with the identification of all the attributes/criteria involved in the decision making process and deals with the establishment of the rule base with multiple antecedents in the ensuing section.
Model the hierarchy using Bayesian networks
After the identification of all the risk attributes, a qualitative Bayesian network can be constructed to present their interactive dependencies. The knowledge about the security assessment and control, together with the intuitive understanding of the various dependencies can be used in such a process. Here the graphical representation becomes very handy and permits safety analysts to express the fundamental relationships of direct or indirect influence between the attributes/criteria. The concept of d-separation can be used to ensure that the network corresponds with a real-world situation and reflects correct causality. 68 Theoretically, the prior probabilities of all the nodes in the network can be obtained by sharing the same principle with the FuRBaR approach, where belief degrees in rule bases modelling a family of parent-child nodes are converted Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains (5) into the conditional probabilities of that child node. However, the development of an appropriate belief rule base in this investigation is not always straightforward given that the number of its rules will exponentially increase with the input of additional antecedent attributes. The large size of a rule base will jeopardise the reliability of expert judgements. With reference to the philosophy of a divorcing approach in Bayesian networks, 45 an evidential reasoning approach 44, 60 is introduced as a support tool to facility the reasonable assignment of belief degrees in the establishment of rule bases involving a large number of antecedents. Its description is given as follows:
1. Calculate the weight of each antecedent attribute involved using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); 69 2. Establish conditional sub-rule bases used to model the quantitative relation between sub-set antecedents and conclusion with respect to the existing statistics or confidence in using expert judgments. Let A1, …, An be a list of antecedent attributes all of which are influencing factors of the conclusion, C. With the increase of n, the specification of belief degrees assigned in the IF-THEN rules, represented as ␤(C|A1, …, An), will require either a very large knowledge acquisition from experts or a very large set of cases from databases. It may be not straightforward to extract such specific configurations in the real world. To handle this kind of task, the n antecedent attributes can be divorced into different categories such as (A1, …, Ai), (Ai+1, …, Aj), ..., (Ak+1, …, An) to establish conditional sub-rule bases. The criterion of divorcing the attributes is designed with reference to the databases available or confidence of using expert knowledge in the configuration process. In an extreme circumstance, n conditional sub-rule bases from ␤(C|A1, …, An) will be established and represented as ␤(C|A1), ␤(C|A2), …, ␤(C|An). By doing so, the process of establishing rule bases with belief structures can be simplified. More importantly, it provides the foundation of updating the rule base when new attributes are identified and incorporated into the existing base. 3. Synthesise the relevant sub-rule bases to form the rule base with a belief structure using ER. 60 
Identification of vulnerable assets in port
In this section, a numerical example is examined using the proposed maritime security management framework. A port is likely to be attacked by terrorists using two ways, attacking the channel/waterway or bombing the quayside infrastructures/facilities of the terminals. A quantitative security assessment is therefore often required for identifying the most vulnerable assets in a port as the reference of investment for its anti-terrorism protection. First, the important bottom level observation attributes associated with the security level and its risk parameter (W, D, R or P) of port facilitates need to be identified for the collection of raw data. They include 'population in the asset (O1)', 'mission role of the asset (O2)', 'ease of access to the asset (O3)', 'symbolic value of the asset (O4)', 'distance to the control perimeter (O5)', 'recognisation of the asset to an unknown person (O6)' and 'time taken to recover mission of the asset (O7)'. The interactive relationships of all the attributes and parameters are modelled in Fig 3. Secondly, such a hierarchy with interactive relations is modelled using a Bayesian network shown in Fig 4, where its quantitative analysis is conducted as follows:
1. The prior unconditional probabilities of all the root nodes are evenly distributed to their states to reflect the unknown/neutral situation before the assessment, as shown in Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains of defining three mutually exclusive intervals, in which any values between the boundaries can be calculated using a linear distribution function to model their probabilities belonging to each state. 2. The conditional probabilities of NS are assigned based on the rule base established in the earlier section on 'construct a fuzzy rule base…' using the FuRBaR approach. 3. The conditional probabilities of NW are calculated using the evidential reasoning approach in the ensuing section. 4. All the other conditional probabilities such as p(O3|O5), p(O6|O4), p(R|O7) and p(D|O1) are assigned directly using expert judgements in the form of subjective probabilities in Table 6 .
To analyse the conditional probability of NW, the relative weights of the seven observation attributes are first calculated using AHP in Table 7 . Simplifying the establishment of the rule base associated with NW requires divorcing ␤(W|O1, O2, O7) from ␤(W|O3, O4, O5, O6) according to expert knowledge. Two conditional sub-rule bases containing ␤(W|O1, O2, O7) and ␤(W|O3, O4, O5, O6) are generated with their individual weights of 0.55 (w1 + w2 + w7 = 0.19 + 0.27 + 0.09) and 0.45 (w3 + w4 + w5 + w6 = 0.09 + 0.18 + 0.09 + 0.09), respectively.
For example, ␤(Wi|O1 = Ն 50, O2 = Crucial, O7 = ≤ 1 month) = (0, 0, 0, 0.9, 0.1) (i = 1, 2, …, 5) is obtained using expert judgement. Similarly, the other conditional belief degrees are estimated in Thirdly, the network established above can be used to infer a neutral security index 0.48, which reflects the security level of a facility when its observation attributes are in an unknown situation. Such a network as a basis can be extended to develop a scenario-based vulnerability identification model which can produce an updated security index with newly available information from dynamic environments.
Suppose the observations associated with a specific asset are described with regard to the root nodes as (30 persons) of O1, (0. Fig 5) . Similarly, if the status of the observation attributes of all the assets in the port is known, then their security levels can be assessed and ranked in a prioritised list and the most vulnerable asset(s) can be identified. Such a network can also function on the dynamic security analysis of a specific asset. For example, if the condition of O1 of the above asset changes into 20 persons, then its security index value can be instantly estimated as 0.55.
To test the result, the variations of input include the change of O1 from 30 to 34 persons (the probability of being ' Ն 50 persons' increases by 10%), of O5 from 80 to 65m (the probability of being ' Ն 200m' decreasing by 10%) and of O7 from 2 to 2.5 months (the probability of being ' Ն 6 months' increasing by 10%). When the changes are given individually, the corresponding security index values are updated When the population in the asset increases, the distance to the controlled perimeter is shorter and the time taken to recover the mission becomes longer, its security level should decrease and security index value should become smaller. The above analysis result keeps a harmony with the fact. When the changes are given together, the corresponding security index values are updated in Table 9 . For a comparison purpose, the updated security values given individual changes have also been attached in this table. If the model reflects the reality, then the security index value associated with x observation attributes (evidence) will be always smaller than the one from x-y (y⑀ x) attributes (sub-evidence). This can be examined by comparing the security index values in the chosen rows in Table 9 . For example, the value in Row 1 is smaller than any other values in the table. Then the value in Row 2 is smaller than the ones in Rows 5 and 6. Such a process continues to investigate all the relationship between the evidence and sub-evidence. The result proves that the model is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The safety consciousness in the supply chain industry has been significantly growing over the last several years. However, the problem of developing and sustaining a highly capable risk assessment technique to meet the diverse needs of sophisticated Container Supply Chains is extremely onerous and arduous, particularly in view of the plethora of challenges and uncertainties posed by the unavailability and incompleteness of historical failure data and the interaction and dependence of risk factors. This paper reviews different uncertainty inference techniques and presents their feasibility in the risk assessment of CSCs. It proposes a subjective risk modelling method using FRBER with belief structures to deal with insufficient historical failure data and also develops a FuRBaR approach (to complement with evidential reasoning) to simplify the associated calculations and to facilitate the development of instant risk ranking. Two case studies for analysing port security risks have been carried out to demonstrate the advantages of the FRBER and FuRBaR, respectively. While FRBER effectively deals with fuzziness caused by unavailability of failure data and incompleteness (caused by the subjective judgement with partial confidence), FuRBaR facilitates the simplification of risk calculations and the modelling of dependency among risk factors. Facilitating uncertainty treatment in the risk assessment of container supply chains Table 8 : Conditional belief degree distributions of the sub-rule bases 
